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The Political Potency of Tibetan Identity in Pop 
Music and Dunglen
Since their beginnings in the 1980s, Tibetan 
pop music and dunglen (lute songs of 
northeastern Tibet) have shown strong 
expressions of Tibetan identity. They also 
represent a flourishing area of Tibetan 
language cultural production. This is significant 
after the repetitive propaganda songs of the 
Cultural Revolution and given the pressures 
and restrictions in Tibet on language and 
religion in particular. However, in this article, 
I critique straightforward interpretations of 
the Tibetanness of Tibetan popular music 
as representing a zone of assertion or 
resistance, arguing instead that the political 
potency of Tibetan pop music and dunglen 
is far more double-edged, coopted and 
complex. Drawing on ethnography, I describe 
how state institutions and largely Tibetan 
cultural workers have in fact played the 
leading role in its genesis and production and 
are still a powerful force in its production 
and dissemination. Moreover, while it is 
often said that the state is against Tibetan 
identity and culture, in fact, the attitude is 
far more ambivalent and contradictory, with 
China a unitary multi-ethnic state where 55 
minority nationalities with distinct culture and 
identity are recognized, including Tibetans. I 
argue through the analysis of song lyrics that 
expressions of Tibetan identity per se are not 
censored; rather, it is when these expressions 
are linked to particular political demands. As I 
explore, a number of reasons can be identified 
as to why the state does not censor Tibetan 
pop music and dunglen more harshly, and 
furthermore, there are reasons why Tibetan 
language assertion has had so much more 
success in the realm of pop music than it 
has had in schools.
Keywords: Tibet, pop music, dunglen, politics, identity, 
language, censorship.
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128 |  HIMALAYA Spring 2018
Tibetan popular music emerged in the 1980s as one of the 
many watershed changes of the post-Cultural Revolution 
era where culture no longer had to be entirely controlled 
and produced by the state to serve socialism. By the late 
1990s, production was prolific, with a widespread live 
performance scene in urban bars and restaurants, rural 
festivals, shows on television and competitions. Tibetan 
popular music was thriving not just in scale of production 
but in terms of ‘Tibetanness,’ too. The folk-popular genre 
dunglen (rdung len, to play and sing) that emerged in Amdo 
always had lyrics in Tibetan, even as it extended into a 
more typical pop sound with computer-generated MIDI 
backing tracks rather than just voice and mandolin. Other 
Tibetan pop music had seen a rapid increase in songs in the 
Chinese language in the 1990s and early 2000s.1 However, 
from the late 2000s on, this tide dramatically turned, with 
the vast majority of Tibetans singing in Tibetan, even some 
who never or hardly ever did before. 
In their lyrics, Tibetan pop music (whether in Tibetan 
or Chinese) and dunglen have been recognized as a 
powerful expression of Tibetan identity, in what Brubaker 
and Cooper would term ‘hard’ form—bold and proud 
delineations of Tibetanness in terms of land, people, 
culture, religion and so on (2000). This has also included 
some covert expressions of sentiments such as loss over 
the absence of the Dalai Lama or desire for independence. 
The expression of ‘hard’ Tibetan identity is perhaps even 
more pronounced at the level of music videos, which are 
subsumed with stunning footage of the Tibetan landscape 
and singers wearing beautiful Tibetan clothes. This is 
the case even with songs whose lyrics are more focused 
on other things like love. As I have described, the lyrical 
and visual imagery of pop and dunglen songs and videos 
contrasts sharply with that of older conceptions of the 
Tibetan land and cosmos in oral sung poetry, and rather 
conforms to patterns that have emerged in the context 
of capitalist transformation and nationalism (Morcom 
2015). Hence, although ideas of a distinct Tibetan identity 
long predate nationalism (Jabb 2011: 14-15) and Tibetan 
songs may not necessarily be intended or interpreted 
in nationalist terms (especially not in separatist terms), 
nationalism and identity politics are an overarching frame. 
In the last few years, there has been a marked rise of love 
songs and also rap, the latter in particular which tends 
to have a more urban focus, and there are more singers 
wearing non-Tibetan clothes in videos. Nevertheless, 
songs describing and celebrating Tibetans and Tibetanness 
continue to form a core part of Tibetan pop and dunglen 
and are popular up to the present day. There are songs that 
are censored and singers that are detained and sometimes 
imprisoned. However, these are a tiny, though of course 
not insignificant, minority. 
Tsering Topgyal has described the Tibet situation in China 
as one of interconnected and relational insecurity: despite 
China’s power, the legitimacy of Chinese rule over the vast 
Tibetan areas is insecure and there are extensive problems 
in integrating the Tibetans successfully. In turn, following 
the myriad state campaigns that have repressed Tibetan 
language and religion in particular, and which continue 
into the present day, there is considerable ‘identity 
insecurity’ for Tibetans, beyond specific nationalist 
agendas (2016: 8-10). In the light of this situation, the 
thriving scenes of dunglen and Tibetan language pop 
music appear to be a highly successful example of the 
foregrounding of Tibetan language and cultural identity 
in prominent, mass-disseminated cultural forms which, 
moreover, are for the large part not repressed by the 
state. It would seem to be an arena where, in response 
to a situation of identity insecurity, some security 
has been and is being built. In an earlier publication, I 
described the semi-deregulated Tibetan music industry 
as “surprising,” and “a remarkable kind of ‘public sphere’ 
in a region famous outside China for repression rather 
than expression” (2008: 262). In a similar vein, Lama Jabb, 
analyzing dunglen songs in terms of their nationalist 
potency, states: “In tandem with modern Tibetan 
literature, popular music indicates the tentative formation 
of an embryonic public space within which Tibetans are 
expressing their common concerns and collective identity 
under difficult political circumstances” (2010: 1). Other 
writers express similar views of the potency of Tibetan 
pop music and dunglen with regard to Tibetan identity 
(Morcom 2004; Henrion-Dourcy 2005; Dhondup 2008; 
Stirr 2008; Warner 2013; Robin 2014; Topgyal 2016) and I 
have spoken to many Tibetans outside of Tibet, including 
those who recently came from Tibet, who explicitly praise 
the potency of Tibetan pop and dunglen. In Tibet, where 
I have not engaged in explicit discussions concerning 
nationalism, identity or protest, I have nevertheless 
seen the passion and pride with which certain songs are 
received, one of which I discuss below, Gangchanpa (gangs 
can pa), ‘Tibetan’, by Dolma Kyab. 
In this article, I explore the potency of Tibetan pop and 
dunglen and that of expressions of Tibetan identity more 
generally.2 The Tibetanness expressed in dunglen and 
pop music is powerful, especially after the repetitive 
propaganda songs of the Cultural Revolution and given 
the restrictions on language and religion in particular. 
Songs in these genres continue to speak profoundly to 
Tibetans. However, state institutions and cultural workers 
have played the leading role in the genesis and production 
of popular music in Tibet. Of course, the state is not 
monolithic and control is never total. But, popular music is 
deeply connected to state institutions rather than being a 
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genuinely separate phenomenon, particularly in the 1980s 
and 1990s and early 2000s. Hence, simple notions of this 
music as a potent zone of Tibetan expression, let alone 
resistance, must be interrogated carefully. 
Moreover, while it is often said that the state is against 
Tibetan identity and culture, in fact, the attitude is far 
more ambivalent and contradictory. Therefore, the 
political agency and potency of assertions of Tibetan 
identity must be examined closely. In the first decade 
of the twentieth century, Chinese nationalism was 
based on an exclusive ethnic nationalism, aimed at 
overthrowing the Manchu Qing Empire. However, after 
this was accomplished in 1911, it was soon realized that 
Chinese nationalism must include other ethnicities than 
the Han in order to retain the vast territories of non-Han 
peoples at the fringes of the empire (Zhao 2004: 22).3 
Thus the People’s Republic of China (PRC), founded in 
1949, was from the beginning a “unitary multiethnic 
state” (Zhao 2004: 165-173). Fifty-five ethnic minorities, 
or ‘nationalities,’ were identified and recognized from 
the early 1950s using Stalin’s four criteria of common 
language, territory, economic life and psychological 
makeup (ibid: 181). The state has severely modified much 
traditional minority culture under agendas of progress, 
civilization and national unity, and aspects that threaten 
the state have been repressed or deprived of support. 
Some periods have been far more repressive than others 
and some aspects of culture more repressed, (most notably, 
religion). But, nevertheless, the state has constantly 
articulated Tibetan people and culture as distinct and, in 
albeit often superficial and stereotyped ways, celebrated 
this distinctness. 
I explore the complexities of the political potency of 
pop music and dunglen in this article first by looking at 
the emergence of these genres in Lhasa and the Amdo 
region of north-east Tibet, focusing on the role played 
by state institutions and employees. I then turn to the 
question of Tibetanness in popular music, looking at 
songs that express ‘hard’ Tibetan identity and are seen 
as subversive, but are not censored, and then songs that 
are censored. From this analysis, it is possible to see how 
far the expression of intense pride in Tibetan culture 
and history per se is contested. This further enables us to 
consider expressions of Tibetan identity in popular songs 
in relation to larger movements and protests in Tibet, in 
particular those relating to culture, and the contrasting 
degree of identity assertion in pop music versus language 
and religion—the two arenas that have engendered the 
strongest feelings in response to repressive policies. 
Tibetan pop and dunglen started to gain critical mass in a 
politically volatile and repressive period in Tibet. 1987 saw 
pro-independence protests in Lhasa, and in 1989 martial 
law was declared. A hardline approach lasted until the late 
1990s, when state-sponsored development became the 
pre-eminent focus for tackling dissidence in Tibet, giving 
rise to extremely rapid urbanization, inequality, and an 
accelerating consumer culture (Fischer 2013; Yeh 2013). 
More recently, there has been an increased focus on culture 
in grassroots movements, civil disobedience and protest. In 
2006, large-scale protests broke out on the Tibetan plateau 
in the form of the public burning of immensely valuable 
pelts including of leopards and tigers that had previously 
been proudly worn as a sign of wealth, status and 
Tibetanness. As Emily Yeh analyses, these protests were 
multilayered. Most prominently, they showed allegiance to 
the exiled Dalai Lama, who shocked Tibetans by stating at 
the Kalachakra Buddhist initiation in India that year that 
if Tibetans continue wearing pelts, “I have no confidence 
in my rebirth and whether it will be of any use” (2013a: 
323). The protests showed devotion to Buddhist morals 
more generally and a rejection of the intense accumulation 
and disparity of wealth that state-sponsored development 
engineered (ibid). In 2008, far more prominent and 
widespread protests broke out in Tibet. These expressed 
support of the Dalai Lama, displayed the banned Tibetan 
flag (implying independence) and called for religious 
freedom (Tibetinfonet 30 March 2010). In Lhasa, there were 
attacks on Han and Hui migrants and their property (Yeh 
2013b). In 2009, waves of self-immolation began, and since 
then over 150 Tibetans have burned themselves to death 
to date (Mcgranahan and Litzinger eds 2012; Shakya 2012; 
Tibetinfonet 31 January 2012). 
Also around 2008, strong movements for self-reliance 
and pure Tibetan language emerged (Yeh 2007; Robin 
2014), and a ‘ten virtues’ Buddhist morals movement, 
which included the commitment to vegetarianism (Gayley 
2013; Buffetrille 2014).4 In 2010, protests by thousands of 
students in several counties in Qinghai broke out against a 
ten-year plan that would see Chinese rather than Tibetan 
as the primary medium of instruction across the prefecture 
(TibetInfoNet [prepared by Stuart Wright] 11 November 
2010; Robin 2014). These extended into Sichuan and 
Beijing, and there were further waves of protests in 2011 
and 2012 (ibid). There have also been powerful writings, 
poems and debates in the Tibetan blogosphere and a genre 
of songs focusing on the Tibetan alphabet (ibid).5 
Thus, not only did Tibetan pop and dunglen first develop 
during a politically volatile time, but the tide towards 
singing only in Tibetan occurred in the politically 
repressive post-2006 to 2008 period, alongside the pure 
Tibetan language and culture movements. Mass-mediated 
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songs of ‘hard’ Tibetan identity would seem particularly 
marked at such politically sensitive times, and particularly 
salient. However, this begs the question of why they 
were not restricted. Very political songs that have been 
censored and resulted in arrests have increased markedly 
in the post-2006 to 2008 period.6 But a mainstream of songs 
of ‘hard’ identity continued. How do these songs fit against 
or alongside the state and its drives to integrate Tibetans 
successfully? And what about the newer phase of urban 
and individualistic love songs or rap songs? 
Debates on Tibetan culture in China are all too often 
polarized between statements that it is flourishing, 
(the Chinese state view), or that it is being destroyed, 
(a prevalent view outside of Tibet). In addition, music 
and performing arts are too easily interpreted in terms 
of ‘asserting’ or ‘expressing’ identity, since the plethora 
of identity-based research from the 1990s in particular. 
However, despite the quantity of such research, there 
has been a lack of analytical sharpness and criticality 
concerning the term itself, as has been pointed out by 
Timothy Rice regarding music (2010) and by Rogers 
Brubaker and Frederick Cooper more generally (2000). 
Notions of music and identity as assertion, expression 
and resistance have joined strands of popular music 
studies that have frequently focused on resistance, 
often against mainstream, ‘commercial’ pop music, 
or against dominant social groups and discourses, 
whether of ethnicity, gender or religion. It is true that 
popular music, in its link to newness, is highly flexible 
and thus a powerful tool for fashioning and combining 
sounds and styles to imagine and create new meanings, 
ideologies and group identities (Turino 1999), often 
connected to young people. Thus, it is an effective “social 
technology” (de Nora 2000) for creating or negotiating 
change. This has certainly been true of Tibetan pop 
and dunglen. However, in the context of multi-ethnic 
nation states for which ethnic and cultural identity is 
part of the fundamental structure and legitimization of 
power, the conflation of music, identity and assertion or 
resistance must be problematized. In addition, we must 
question how the arena of music, and indeed, cultural 
heritage more generally, compares to that of language 
or religion in terms of the assertion of Tibetanness or 
protest. Mass-mediated, audio-visual music and live 
performance has a different kind of visibility to language 
and religion in everyday life, and a different way in which 
it performatively constitutes social and cultural fabric. As 
I explore in the article, there are reasons why the state 
does not censor Tibetan pop music and dunglen more 
harshly. Furthermore, there are reasons why Tibetan 
language assertion has had so much more success in the 
realm of pop music than it has had in schools.  
This article is based on many years of involvement in 
Tibetan music dating from 1990, and numerous fieldwork 
trips to Tibet carried out between 2004 and 2007. However, 
I have not been able to visit Tibet since 2007, and a very 
different climate has emerged there since 2008. Thus, I 
also rely on mediated or second-hand information from 
Tibet and on Tibetan pop music itself, widely available on 
YouTube and other internet sources. 
The Interweaving of State and Independent Production in 
Tibetan Popular Music
Popular music in the sense of mass-mediated music driven 
at least in part by audience demand and market exchange 
developed in China as a whole following the end of the 
Cultural Revolution in 1976. The planned economy quickly 
started to recede with the first market reforms in 1978, 
and the restriction on anything but socialist culture also 
stopped, with many traditional performing arts revived. 
Mass-mediated culture, however, remained controlled by 
the government. Thus, the recording industry grew almost 
entirely out of government institutions. 
The first album produced in the Tibet Autonomous Region 
was ‘Songs of the Holy Land No. 1’ (Naychog luyang 1, gnas 
mchog glu dbyangs 1). Released around 1985 by the Tibet 
[TAR] Audio Publishing House, it featured members of the 
Tibet Song and Dance Troupe, including Jampa Tsering, 
Nyima Tsering, Dadon and Lhagdron. However, it was not 
until 1987 when Dadon, a violinist of the Tibet Song and 
Dance Troupe, released her first album of pop songs, that 
the first post-Cultural Revolution musical craze was born 
in central Tibet. This album, ‘My Dondrub Tsering’ (Nga 
yi Dondrub Tsering, nga yi don grub tshe ring), which sold a 
remarkable 20,000 copies, shot Dadon to fame. As Isabelle 
Henrion-Dourcy writes, in terms of musical style, it was 
a genuinely new style for Tibetan music, deriving not 
from the state styles but from Taiwain and Hong Kong, in 
particular, the famous singer Dèng Lìjūn (2005: 234-246). It 
broke the previous monopoly of the ideologically-charged 
style of state performing arts institutions on modern, 
mass-mediated music.7 In addition to the musical style, 
the lyrics of Dadon’s songs contained unprecedented 
expressions of Tibetan identity and emotion, as I discuss 
more below (ibid; Dhondup 2008).8
However, while the album was certainly radical in terms 
of musical style and lyrics and had a profound impact on 
Tibetan listeners, it was not an independent production 
but a production of government work units: the Tibet 
[TAR] Song and Dance Troupe and the Tibet Audio 
Publishing House (Henrion-Dourcy 2005: 241; Dhondup 
2008: 7). A private sphere had not emerged at this time. 
Dadon, herself a member of the Tibet Song and Dance 
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Troupe, sang as a part of her work unit duties, for no 
extra money. The lyricists and composers and musicians 
were also employees of the government work units. The 
Tibet Audio Publishing House received the considerable 
profit from the album.9 As with all albums, the lyrics of 
‘My Dondrub Tsering’ were checked by the government 
offices before the album was released, a practice that still 
continues today.10
Although the album did come from within the government 
sphere, government policy towards art and culture had 
changed in the post-Cultural Revolution period, and just 
as significantly, that towards minorities. Furthermore, 
commercial popular music from Taiwan, Hong Kong and 
mainland China was available in society at large, notably 
in karaoke bars. Indeed, Dadon gained her experience from 
singing in karaoke bars, not from the state institutions 
where she studied and performed (Henrion-Dourcy 2005: 
236). In addition, Dadon was influenced by an album of the 
Tibetan exile band Freedom Youth (Rangtsen Zhonu, rang 
tsan gzhon nu) which had been ‘smuggled’ into Lhasa (ibid). 
The first more genuinely private album in the TAR was 
made in 1990 by Jampa Tsering, with a similar musical 
style to Dadon’s.11 This album, named ‘Mother’s Boy’ (Amai 
Bu, A ma’i bu), was privately funded by Jampa Tsering, who 
also kept the profits. However, it was still closely linked 
to state institutions. Firstly, it was recorded in a state 
recording studio, as there were no private studios at this 
time. Secondly, Jampa Tsering was himself an ex-employee 
(primarily a pianist) of the Tibet Song and Dance Troupe; 
he had also sung on the album ‘Songs of the Holy Land 
no 1’. He had been recently sacked from his work unit 
for singing in commercial bars. However, he had a good 
relationship with the composer and recordist Tenzin 
Penor, with whom he had previously worked, and also the 
personnel of the Audio Publishing House, and so was able 
to produce a ‘private’ album using facilities of the Audio 
Publishing House. 
Access to non-government artists only gradually improved 
around the mid 1990s with the establishment of the 
first private recording studio in 1994 by Penor. Around 
this time, it became easier to buy the International 
Standard Recording Code (ISRC) necessary to legally 
publish an album in China from the Audio Publishing 
House. However, although private albums are routinely 
made in this way, strictly speaking the sale of ISRCs to 
private individuals is not allowed. Rather, all albums 
are supposed to be produced by the government, with 
outside singers contracted by the government offices. The 
government clearly turns a blind eye to this and de facto 
allows private production, and most people have no idea 
it is not allowed (Morcom 2008: 262). However, because 
the ISRC is only available from the provincial Audio 
Publishing Houses (and indeed, the only private recording 
studio for some years was owned by a state employee), 
initially it was only possible for a small circle of people in 
government institutions or in close touch with them to 
make private albums. 
Access to outsiders improved further since the early 2000s 
because of the emergence of a number of other private 
studios in Lhasa and Chengdu. These can arrange the ISRC 
and other formalities for singers through contacts they 
have with people in government offices. But, contacts 
and social capital are still important in gaining the 
necessary access to even private studios, as I discovered 
while spending time with Tibetan singers from different 
backgrounds (Morcom 2008). Such studios have increased 
far more rapidly in the 2010s, and popular music has 
certainly gained more autonomy from the state. The only 
other option to getting an ISRC is to produce and sell 
albums illegally. This has happened in Tibet, and is the way 
some very political albums are produced today as in the 
past, but it is not very prevalent.12 
The development of popular music in Amdo followed 
a similar pattern, though it happened earlier and has 
been far more prolific. In Amdo, the main style that 
emerged was dunglen. Dunglen has been an exceptionally 
far-reaching and durable style, and a form of Amdo 
pop has developed from and alongside dunglen with 
MIDI accompaniment as well as or instead of mandolin 
or dranyen (sgra snyan). Dunglen or Amdo/dunglen pop 
grew to be the dominant style in Amdo as well as being 
popular in other nomadic areas of Tibet. As with new 
pop music from Lhasa, the birth, development and 
propagation of dunglen is heavily tied up with government 
institutions and personnel. 
The lute songs in Amdo that became dunglen in fact derived 
from traditions within the Labrang monastery (Morcom 2011: 
404-7). Such songs were first performed in 1956 by a singer 
named Jigme who was a member of a government troupe in 
Gannan. He had previously learned them from the monastery 
when he was a monk there.13 However, dunglen really became 
a major musical trend in the post-Cultural Revolution era 
after 1981 when it was disseminated across Amdo by the 
Xining and Gannan Radio Offices. Jigme sang extensively 
on the early radio and also taught dranyen to many people. 
Slightly later, Jishi Tso and Palgon emerged as singing stars. 
Jishi Tso was a singer and dancer from the Gannan Song and 
Dance Troupe who had performed widely in state troupes 
in the 1950s and 1960s where the focus was, needless to say, 
propaganda.14 Palgon, of Machu county, Gannan, learned 
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folk songs via his father. As a student in the Northwest 
Nationalities College in Lanzhou, Gansu province, in the early 
1980s, he often played music with other students. He returned 
to Machu to be a doctor and started learning dranyen from 
Alak Gungthang Rinpoche, the second most senior religious 
leader of Labrang monastery.15 In 1981, Pema Khar, the 
recordist of Gannan Radio Office, was looking for singers for 
a radio program. He heard of Palgon through word-of-mouth 
and invited him to sing on the radio show.16 Pema, Palgon and 
Jishi Tso together composed many songs, including lyrics, 
adapting them from local folk songs, dance songs, and the 
Labrang monastery traditions. They experimented with small 
ensembles of instruments played by Palgon and also Pema, 
and Palgon adapted dunglen to the mandolin, which became 
the standard accompanying instrument. 
In 1986, again looking for new singers, Pema went to 
Machu County and visited the secondary school there. 
While he was talking to the head teacher, inquiring after 
talented singers, he heard a young man with a particularly 
beautiful voice singing in the playground. He asked this 
man, Dube, if he knew dunglen, and Dube replied that he 
could sing (having learned songs from the radio), but did 
not know how to play. Pema introduced him to Palgon, 
who taught him—and countless subsequent singers—how 
to play mandolin, and Dube’s songs were broadcast on 
the radio and released on cassette.17 Dube joined the 
Machu government troupe and was a member for thirteen 
years.18 He became the most famous and prolific singer of 
Amdo and one of Tibet’s most important modern cultural 
icons, greatly mourned after his death in 2016. Dube sang 
extensively with Tashi Dolma, a female singer from the 
Labrang County Song and Dance Troupe, within Gannan 
Prefecture, also one of the very best-loved Amdo singers. 
Dore, another of this second wave of Amdo singing stars, 
also emerged in 1986. He was a teacher, and not a part of 
a government song and dance troupe, but like Dube and 
Palgon, gained the opportunity to sing on the radio and 
release albums through Pema. He made his first album 
in 1988, sponsored by the Gannan Radio Office.19 Pema 
recounted how he was in the dorm of the Nationalities 
Teacher Training College in Gannan with a friend when he 
was intrigued to see a much-used guitar lying there, a rare 
sight at the time. This belonged to Dore, who had learned 
dunglen songs from the radio.20 Dunglen has since often 
been accompanied on recordings and radio with a guitar 
playing simple, rhythmic chords along with the mandolin 
or dranyen that plays with the melody. 
Thus, dunglen was mobilized, developed and spread via the 
Gannan and also Xining Radio Offices, although its root 
form came from Labrang monastery. While many singers 
belonged to government song and dance troupes, others 
were scouted or discovered through contacts in the small 
world of the Tibetan educated elite, as with Palgon and 
Dore. The Gannan Radio Office issued the first cassettes 
in Amdo in 1983-1984, the first cassettes for the whole 
of Tibet.21 As with Lhasa, these cassettes were produced 
strictly by the government office as a part of its duties to 
serve the public. The first private cassette was made in 
1988, by Palgon, though recorded by Pema in the Radio 
Office in Gannan. Private production took off around the 
mid-1990s when it became possible to buy ISRCs. However, 
like the situation in the TAR, it was necessary to have good 
contact with the relevant government offices to be able to 
do this. Since the 2010s, private studios have mushroomed, 
making popular music more independent from the state.
Government institutions still have a strong presence in 
Amdo popular music, and among singers and lyricists. 
While Palgon and Dore were not formally a part of the 
Machu Song and Dance Troupe, they are associated with 
them and perform with them on big occasions, and they 
both gained exposure through collaborating with Pema. 
More recently, the successful pop/rock band Turquoise 
Dragon (Yu Drug) emerged from Machu Song and Dance 
Troupe around 2006. The singers Riga and Dartso are from 
the Serta County troupe and Dronpe sang regularly with 
them for many years, though she was a Tibetan doctor by 
profession. There are also renowned singers in the Labrang 
County and Gannan Prefecture troupes, such as Tashi 
Dolma and Gonpo Dondrub. The major recording centers 
remained the Gannan and Xining Radio Offices, although 
Chengdu became significant later. Since 2005, private 
recording studios in Xining have become active in dunglen 
and pop production. Key composers and lyricists also hold 
government jobs, such as Pema, or the lyricists Manlha 
Kyab, Druglha Gyal and Chone Yumtsering.22 In addition, 
dancers from state troupes moonlight in nangma (nang ma) 
bars to supplement their state salaries, something common 
across Tibet (Morcom 2008); indeed, the state style of 
dance they are trained in has been adopted extensively 
in popular culture (Morcom 2007). Lyricists, composers 
and arrangers with government jobs cater extensively for 
independent singers. 
State radio and later television, have played an immensely 
important role in spreading popular music and giving 
singers publicity and status, from the earliest singers, 
such as Dadon, onwards. A dunglen competition was held 
in 1994 with participation from across Amdo, in which 
the singer Sherten first got exposure as a child. Televised 
singing competitions organized by government offices 
have become common at different administrative levels 
(e.g. county or prefecture). Television offices organize New 
Year programs and other concerts. Festivals of Tibetan 
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music highlighting dunglen and Tibetan pop music from 
Amdo and other parts of Tibet also took place in 2003 in 
Qilian, and on a larger scale in 2005 in Machu and 2006 in 
Rebkong, sponsored by these county governments. The 
Xining Radio Office produced immensely popular Video 
CDs (VCDs) of these competitions and festivals. The county 
and prefecture governments in other Tibetan areas also 
support summer festivals, including horse race festivals 
with live music, dancing and sports. Some of these festivals 
involve large scale performances by famous artists with 
choreographed dancing by state performers, though these 
singers are not all members of state groups. 
However, there is no doubt that there is a much larger role 
played by the private or commercial sphere in the 2000s 
and 2010s than in the 1990s, let alone the 1980s. In addition 
to private studios, there are now many live performance 
venues, in particular drinking houses known as nangma 
bars, and restaurants with music and dance entertainment. 
Singers are able to gain good salaries in these 
establishments, making it a viable profession for many, 
although albums, like elsewhere in the world, are now not 
generally made for profit since the explosion of piracy in 
the digital era (Morcom 2008). Numerous successful singers 
have set up their own nangma bars such as Yungdrung Gyal 
and Gangshi in Lhasa and many more in Chengdu. Yadong 
set up a state-of-the-art recording studio in Chengdu 
in the mid-2000s. In addition, Tibetan businessmen and 
also Buddhist clergy have supported Tibetan pop music 
as patrons, and are keen to help sustain Tibetan popular 
culture and talented singers, something that started in the 
1990s if not earlier (ibid). Many monasteries and clergy also 
produce albums in praise of Lamas or the monastery with 
dunglen singers, which helps to support their livelihoods. 
This music is indistinguishable from dunglen or Amdo pop 
in general in terms of musical style (Gayley 2016).
Constructing Tibetan Identity in Tibetan Popular Songs
Government performing arts and media institutions can 
be seen as forming the heart of the energy, enthusiasm 
and funding for popular music and dunglen in the early 
period. State performers, composers, recordists and 
other personnel still play an important role across the 
Tibetan plateau, and in terms of organizing large festivals, 
competitions and various televised music programs, the 
state holds a pre-eminent position. I now turn to the 
question of Tibetan pop and dunglen and the powerful 
expression of Tibetan identity that emanated first from 
these state institutions. I focus largely on lyrical content, 
since it is lyrics more than musical style where political 
expression takes place in today’s Tibet. I begin with songs 
that are strong expressions of ‘hard’ Tibetan identity but 
were not censored, or not immediately. I analyze two. In 
the next section, I explore songs that were censored and 
resulted in arrests, or could have done so, again looking 
at two examples. I thus look at the different ends of the 
spectrum of pop and dunglen and the degree to which 
articulation of ‘hard’ identity in Tibetan pop songs can be 
tolerated under government policy, or even be to some 
degree synergetic with it. It must be noted that songs may 
be acceptable in some periods and become unacceptable in 
others. Songs may also become unacceptable if a particular 
singer gets in political trouble. However, my focus here 
is on the abiding themes of identity in lyrics and their 
expression. The first song I discuss is ‘Tibetan’, Gangchanpa 
(literally, ‘Person of the snows’, i.e., of the ‘snowland’, 
gangjong [gangs ljongs]), by Dolma Kyab (lyrics: Chone 
Yumtsering; music: Chang Zhangtrang), an immensely 
popular song from 2006:23 24
Eastward in this world, a compassionate people, 
trodden under foot
Look from afar toward the realm of bliss, climbing 
the snowy peaks that hold up the sky.
Even as our lives, like sand, are carried by the wind 
across the samsaric plain of misery,
With a vast, open, unsurpassed heart, hold in mind 
beings of the six realms.
We Tibetans of the snow mountains 
descend from kings.
In happy times, I share heartfelt words.
In difficult times, I sing songs of sorrow.
The red-faced [Tibetans] who ride astride the horn 
tips of golden yaks,
On the banks of the Yarlung Tsangpo river, their 
stallion’s hooves resound in the four directions.
On Ama’s [mother’s] face, age and distress [show] 
from years, months of the joys and sorrows of the 
three provinces [Tibet]
Even so, the sweet songs of the pristine land of our 
fathers still reverberate across the blue sky.
We Tibetans of the snow mountains 
descend from kings.
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In happy times, I share heartfelt words.
In difficult times, I sing songs of sorrow.
People of the snow mountains,
We Tibetans of the snow mountains 
descend from kings.
In this deeply loved song, the lyrics depict the Tibetan 
people in grand and epic terms, tracing them back across 
eons to mythical times and locating them in the vastness of 
the whole globe: the east of the world, the four directions, 
the sky, earth, mountains, rivers and animals. The Tibetan 
people are presented as primordially old and anciently 
entwined with Buddhism, and as having a clear geography, 
way of life and a lineage that can be traced back to kings. 
The poetry is made even more emotive with the Tibetans 
portrayed as having suffered, being ‘trodden under foot,’ 
and the face of the mother that personifies the motherland 
and the ‘joys and sorrows of the three provinces’ portrayed 
as aged and weary. 
The three provinces refer to the Tibetan areas of 
Kham, Amdo and Utsang. These can be referred to 
uncontentiously, especially individually. The term ‘the 
three provinces’ (and ideas of a territorially integrated 
Tibet) date back to the thirteenth century at least (Jabb 
2011: 14-15). In the modern day, the phrase is used to refer 
to an ‘original,’ unified Tibet. It is such a unified national 
homeland that Tibetan nationalists call for, either as a 
separate state or as a zone of genuine autonomy according 
to the Dalai Lama’s ‘Middle Way’. Under China, in contrast, 
the Tibetan areas are divided amongst the province of 
‘Tibet’ (the Tibet Autonomous Region, Xizang) and then 
Tibetan Autonomous Prefectures and Counties within the 
Chinese provinces of Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan and Yunnan. 
Gangjong, the ubiquitous term for Tibet, ‘land of snows’ or 
‘snowy land’, which is at the heart of the song Gangchanpa 
(‘person of the land of snows’), is also an image of Tibet 
with deep historical and cultural roots that transcends the 
local (Jabb 2011: 17-19). 
The song is sung by Dolma Kyab, an impressively tall, 
broad, long-haired nomad from Amdo, with a spectacular 
voice, reaching long high notes to sing the choruses and 
extended last syllable of gangs chan pa. This builds from 
a low and brewing beginning, with repeated chords 
punctuating the accompaniment, giving a pulsing and 
almost militaristic feel to the music. In appearance and 
voice, Dolma Kyab himself is an archetypal Tibetan. The 
song is an extremely potent expression of the Tibetan land 
and people, and is loved for its patriotism and its powerful 
assertion of Tibetanness. However, this song, in its Tibetan 
language version, was first performed in 2006 at a large 
festival in Rebkong, Amdo, organized by the government, 
and where all song lyrics were vetted by censors.25 The 
lyricist has a government job. 
While songs on a number of topics exist, nevertheless, the 
focus on Tibetanness in Tibetan pop music and dunglen 
is ubiquitous. Terms such as the ‘land of snows’ and 
‘Tibet’ (böd, bod) abound, as do well-worn images of the 
distinctive flora and fauna of Tibet and the Tibetan people 
as one: ‘red-faced Tibetans’ or ‘children of the snow lands’ 
(Morcom 2015; Roche forthcoming). Thus, a song such 
as Gangchanpa is in a sense typical. Videos also generally 
depict singers wearing beautiful Tibetan clothes in the 
spectacular Tibetan countryside (Morcom 2015).26
Such powerful expressions of Tibetanness can be traced 
back to the beginnings of Tibetan popular music, and 
indeed, Tibetan new poetry from the 1980s. Tibetan song 
lyrics are largely written by poet-intellectuals with a 
knowledge of classical Tibetan literature and poetry (Jabb 
2011), most working in government offices.27 The songs 
of Dadon are archetypical in this regard, and were well 
loved at the time, and are today too. The song Riwo riwo 
Jomolangma (ri wo ri wo jo mo glang ma), ‘Mount Everest’, 
from the late 1980s is such an example:28
Mount Everest (Jomolangma), unwavering
The love of those Tibetans at home and those away 
from home [shi che (gzhis byes)]
is firmer than [the mountain] Dorje Drag
To gather together,
it would be so happy to be able to gather together
The river Yarlung Tsangpo
please send a message [to]
our own brothers and sisters who are away 
from home [yul gyar] 
there is no way we can forget you
To gather together,
it would be so happy to be able to gather together
Beautiful fatherland, land of Tibet, 
brethren, beloved from our hearts
Come to greet us with the a shi ceremonial scarf,
We are here waiting for you to come
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To gather together,
it would be so happy to be able to gather together
The song outlines the beauty and grandeur of the Tibetan 
land, the pha yul, with two vast, iconic features named: 
Mount Everest and the Yarlung Tsangpo river, the 
Brahmaputra. It expresses longing for the uniting of shi che 
Tibetans, those ‘at home and abroad’, or of those Tibetans 
at home and those who are yul gyar, which means ‘away 
from home,’ ‘refugees,’ or ‘in another country.’ Although 
these terms could refer to people away from a village or 
locality, given the focus of the song on Tibet as a whole, 
there is a strong, though not explicit, sense that the 
reference is to the exiles. In this way, this song is perhaps 
politically in a greyer area than Gangchanpa, and unlikely 
to be showcased on state media in today’s Tibet, which is 
considerably less liberal than the 1980s. However, it was 
also Dadon’s defection in 1992 that made the political 
import of her songs far more intense. Nevertheless, 
Dadon’s songs have been sung and heard in Tibet since she 
left. Indeed, a Chinese member of staff in the Tibet Audio 
Publishing House suggested I make an album singing her 
songs, because people would like them. This would have 
been sponsored by this government office (Morcom 2008). 
I have often heard it said by Tibetans that such songs as 
Dadon’s were not censored because they slipped past the 
understanding of the censors due to their use of metaphor. 
It is true that metaphor is abundant in Tibetan songs, 
hinting at political meanings to those thinking in that way, 
though not necessarily obvious to those who are not.29 
However, even if it was the case then, which is unlikely, 
and would assume no censors knew Tibetan well, this is 
certainly not the case anymore. In addition, the two songs 
described above do not actually use metaphor in their 
expression of ‘hard’ Tibetan identity and unity of Tibetans 
and the Tibetan land. Needless to say, if the Chinese state 
wanted to, they could certainly restrict Tibetan song lyrics 
far more than they do. 
I would argue instead that the persistence of such songs 
is not because potent meanings are hidden and missed 
by censors. Rather, it is because they are expressions 
of reified Tibetan culture and identity that are, in basic 
form, a part of Chinese nationalism—the celebration of 
the Tibetans as a distinct minority ethnicity within China 
as well as Tibetan nationalism—the desire to separate 
from China and form a Tibetan nation state or have real 
autonomy within China. They thus support China’s minzu 
or ‘ethnicity’ narrative, that of the distinct ethnicity 
and cultural identity of all the nationalities, and it is not 
surprising to see such songs coming from or circulated 
by state offices. At the very least, such expressions are 
acceptable in China, or not unacceptable. In performing 
arts, ethnic difference was reified while at the same time 
watered down and expressed in stereotypical ways and 
performed in the state style, to give a socialist realist and 
professional, ‘modern’ version of Tibetan culture that 
was, importantly, similar to that of all the other minority 
nationalities (Morcom 2011). Thus, there are songs that 
celebrate Tibetanness albeit in these clichéd ways that 
go back to China’s socialist period. The following song 
from before the Cultural Revolution period, ‘Tibet is Our 
Fatherland’ (Boejong ngatsoei phayul rey, bod ljongs nga tsho’i 
pha yul red), is an example of this:30 
To the magnificent benevolent sun
With happiness and respect we go to offer 
scarves of welcome
Tibet is our fatherland
Tibet is our fatherland
The green mountains, the place of the nomads
The white snow mountains, the good wa-
ter fields and grass
The well-fed yak and sheep
Soyala, soyala, soyala [vocables]
We love our country dearly
We love the motherland dearly 
You play the dranyen
We play the dranyen
We sing and dance
All the nationalities are in one accord 
Sing songs for Chairman Mao
In this song, we see a clear depiction, representation and 
thus construction of Tibetan identity in the repetition 
of the fatherland (pha yul), the mountains, the nomads, 
the yak, the dranyen (the emblematic Tibetan lute) and 
the stereotypical Tibetan ‘empty’ song vocables, so ya 
la. This is all framed into a welcoming of Chairman Mao, 
referred to in the first line as the sun, to whom the happy 
Tibetans offer scarves of welcome, singing of the unity of 
the nationalities. Such images of minorities singing and 
dancing in joy are ubiquitous in the socialist period, and 
a key way in which minorities have been infantilized and 
subordinated by a paternalistic Han-majority state.31 
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Interestingly, however, we can see ways in which there 
are continuities from such songs into the present day, as 
well as the obvious differences. If we replace Chairman 
Mao with a Lama (which, referred to as the sun in the first 
line could strongly imply the Dalai Lama), and instead of 
the line about the nationalities in one accord insert, say, 
a line about the greatness and beauty of the Tibetan land 
and people, this could be a contemporary song (although 
not the most poetically sophisticated). In addition to 
continuities in identity-based lyrics, so ya la vocables are 
still used extensively in contemporary Tibetan pop songs. 
However, even with such adaptations, contemporary 
songs of Tibetan culture and identity like Gangchanpa or 
Dadon’s songs express these things much more richly 
than this propaganda song, and are suffused with more 
inner emotion and pride in Tibetanness itself. But, this 
does not constitute any conflict with the state. Following 
the 1984 Law on Regional National Autonomy, protections 
for minorities and their culture were made more explicit. 
Although the state’s treatment of language and religion in 
particular has left the relevance of this law questionable 
(Topgyal 2016: 68-71; Dodin 2008), there has been, 
relatively, far more celebration, however superficial, of 
Tibetan and other minority culture since the mid-1980s, 
and space for traditional forms or less heavily modified 
forms, as well as pop music. 
Another important difference in contemporary songs that 
was seen first in Dadon’s songs is the expression of sadness 
and longing. As Henrion-Dourcy writes, Dadon’s songs 
“gave voice, for the first time since the 1950s, to a feeling 
of grief amongst Tibetans, emerging after the hardships 
of the previous twenty years” (2005: 237). Thus, in Riwo 
riwo Jomolangma, it is unity with the Tibetans away from 
home that would bring happiness, and in Gangchanpa, the 
Tibetans are described as ‘trodden under foot.’32 In the 
old socialist songs, Tibetans were always happy, rejoicing 
at ‘peaceful liberation’ and so on, and all the songs of the 
Cultural Revolution era were upbeat in tempo and mood. 
Censored Songs
Turning to songs that actually have been censored, or 
could be censored, we can see clearly that it is not proud 
expressions of the Tibetan land, people and culture (even 
religious culture) that are unacceptable. Indeed, these 
are abundant in most Tibetan pop songs, including those 
embraced by the state and showcased on state television 
or in state festivals. It is rather when particular political 
agendas are attached to this Tibetanness. The following 
song, ‘Three Provinces,’ by the singer Sonam Rinchen, 
released at the end of 2011, is an example:33 
The beloved region of U-Tsang
Where the snow mountains of Tibet are im-
bued with compassion
The divine Buddha Yishin Norbu
Who Tibetans tell their happiness and sorrows to
The beloved region of Kham
Where the snow mountains of Tibet are 
imbued with loyalty
The courageous heroes
Who will fight for the freedom of Tibet
The beloved region of Amdo
Where the language of the snow mountains 
of Tibet flourishes
The compassionate Tibetan youth
Who will think about the future of Tibet
This song describes the characteristics of Tibetans of the 
three provinces, naming the most sacred statue, the Jowo, 
in Lhasa; the brave fighters of Kham; and the excellence of 
Tibetan language and literature that is found in Amdo. It is 
the lines about the freedom fighters in Kham, mentioning 
the freedom of Tibet and referring to the armed resistance 
to Chinese rule that took place from the 1950s till 1972, 
that is clearly unacceptable. With a small tweak to that 
line, to, say, a statement that the Khampas are brave and 
strong with rich traditions of dance (Kham is famous for 
dance songs), this could be a completely acceptable song 
sung in a state-sponsored festival. I would, however, 
presume it unlikely for it to be sung for an official state 
occasion because of the reference to the Jowo, and 
therefore religion, as the heart of U-Tsang.34 I am not 
aware whether Sonam Rinchen and those involved in the 
album were arrested or not, but this song as it is could 
not be sung openly. 
Other subversive songs are more slogan-like in their lyrics, 
for example, the song ‘Victory to the Gods’ by the Amdo 
singer Gepe, who was arrested and detained for some 
time following the release of an album in 2012 entirely 
consisting of defiant Tibetan songs:35 
Today, victory to the Dalai Lama!
Today, victory to the fine leader of Tibet!
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Today, victory to the coming of happiness!
Today, victory to the Dalai Lama!
Today, victory to the fine leader of Tibet!
Today, victory to the coming of happiness!
Victory to the Gods!
Victory to Tibet!
Today, victory to the six million [Tibetans]!
Today, victory to Tibet, the source of knowledge!
Today, victory to Tibetans of the Snowland!
Today, victory to our great kinsmen!
Today, victory to Tibetans around the world!
Today, victory to the children of the Snowland!
Today, victory to an auspicious day!
Today, wish-fulfilling day, victory to Tibet!
For the reunification of Tibetans, home and 
abroad, victory to us!
For the reunification of Tibetans, home and 
abroad, victory to us!
Here, although some of the typical epithets of Tibet such as 
‘the snowland’ are used, as well as less-conventional ones 
such as Tibet as ‘the source of knowledge’, the phrases 
are a small part of the repeated message of victorious 
welcoming of the Dalai Lama as leader of Tibet and the 
return of Tibetans from abroad. This implies the end of the 
current status quo and presumably freedom or genuine 
autonomy in Tibet. Thus, this clear song of resistance 
to the current regime is not ‘about’ Tibetan identity, or 
particularly intensely imbued with it. 
Conclusions: Cultural Production, Performativity, and the 
Political Potency of Tibet’s Identity-Based Pop Music
I have described the emergence of popular music in Tibet 
as something that has come from the state realm, and 
still has a heavy involvement of the state. It can seem 
surprising that the state has nurtured, supports or at least 
tolerates a popular music culture with strong expressions 
of Tibetanness—one that has come to be to a large degree 
identity-based, and moreover, largely in the Tibetan 
language since around 2008. Are songs such as Gangchanpa 
a form of protest or resistance, or a form of successful 
assertion of Tibetan identity in Tibet itself, a way in 
which ‘true’ Tibetan voices are able to speak out against a 
repressive or at least very controlling state? 
The answer is complex. These songs are strong expressions 
of Tibetan identity and unity. However, these expressions 
are acceptable. It is when these messages of identity 
and unity are attached to political demands that they 
warrant censorship. The kind of identity expressed is 
in the discourse of nationalist identity politics, a way of 
displaying the characteristics of the nationality (or nation, 
if interpreted in separatist terms) as unique, as different 
from other nationalities (or nations), and expressing 
pride in this. This is consonant with the framing and 
containment of Tibetans as a nationality by the state, an 
intensive focus on ethnicity going back to socialist times. 
As Stevan Harrell has stated, the Chinese multi-ethnic state 
has helped to hone distinct Tibetan identity (1995: 27), at 
least its modern form. Thus, such a song is certainly not 
oppositional to the state, or at least it is not the assertion 
of identity that is a protest. 
But, at the same time, these songs are certainly not devoid 
of political potency. There are ways in which they can 
constitute some resistance or successful assertion, yet 
without disturbing the overarching structure and its 
political force. As Holly Gayley has explored in her work 
on the cleric Khenpo Jigme Phuntsog’s influential 1995 
book Heart Advice to Tibetans for the 21st Century, there is the 
“possibility of appropriating and redefining the dominant 
terms of discourse in minority publications” (2013) 
rather than being subject entirely to their definitions. 
While ‘culture and identity’ pop songs and dunglen do not 
redefine the terms of discourse, they do shape it strongly 
to add particular colors and emotions. In this way, it can 
be said that this is a successful negotiation or assertion 
within limited parameters, a maximizing of what is 
possible within limits; it would be worse for Tibetans if 
songs only delineated Tibetan ‘hard’ identity in the more 
demeaning or trivial terms that are found in official state 
discourse even to this day. These songs could in this sense 
be described as a form of fighting fire with fire. This can 
win over, or appropriate, the original discourse through 
a discourse that is similar to what is being resisted, but 
shaped in a preferable way, i.e., that Tibetan identity 
is asserted with intense pride and richness, and with 
powerful statements of Tibetan unity too (for example, 
the three provinces). But at the same time, it works 
within, and can be synergetic or reinforcing of, the basic 
category of discourse: that of the Tibetans as a delineated 
minority nationality.36 
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In this sense, these ‘culture and identity’ songs could 
arguably be seen to be a permitted form of assertion 
or resistance. This may be something that writers and 
singers, whether working within the state or beyond it, 
are conscious of, or it may be unconscious (and it is not 
something an ethnographer could ethically question). 
Indeed, the discourse of identity and the push and pull of 
what Topgyal terms the insecurity dilemma (2016) have 
been so prevalent that it is difficult not to internalize them 
to some degree. Thus, what is intended by some writers 
(whether within or outside of the state realm) as resistance 
or assertion or subversion may be similar to what others 
have intended as mere celebration of Tibetan culture. 
However, at the same time, these songs still have an effect 
on a great many listeners. It is certainly the case that some 
Tibetans interpret such songs as expressive of a nationalist 
sentiment, as being subversive, or, more simply, love them 
in a way and for reasons that the state would not entirely 
approve of were this to be articulated. This is because it 
would be a pride in the Tibetan nationality that is too great 
to fit comfortably into unitary multiethnic China. But, 
given that these feelings and interpretations are not able 
to be articulated openly, the political expression of these 
songs can only be felt and shared in limited contexts. Such 
songs may well be a part of what garners some people 
to engage in acts that constitute a real resistance to the 
Chinese state and the status quo, or to believe that greater 
freedom, as autonomy or independence, is deserved or 
a right. But, at the same time, the consequences should 
things go too far are well known, as many cycles of protest 
and suppression have shown. 
It is also important to note that these songs may become 
much more subversive in a fundamental sense and may 
be more restricted by the state in the future. Since the 
protests of 2008, questions have been raised about the 
whole validity of the framework of multiculturalism and 
the special levels of protection of minority rights and 
identity. There are calls to get rid of this framework and 
these protections (Leibold 2013) and evidence that such 
a process has begun, for example, in the arena of Tibetan 
language education. 
There are further plausible reasons why the state does 
not clamp down on pop songs and dunglen. While it 
is commonly noted that there are pop songs that are 
incredibly powerful expressions of Tibetan identity, few 
scholars have remarked that the overall image of Tibet and 
Tibetans portrayed in pop music, whether ‘strong’ songs or 
not, is one that conforms to the government presentation 
of the Tibetan landscape—that is, as something beautiful, 
stunning and an attraction to tourists; as not spoiled 
(for example through mining); and as empty of poor and 
working people (Morcom 2015). Urban areas in videos are 
also utopian. Similarly, singers are presented in exquisite 
ethnic clothes, and look exemplary. As I have discussed, 
pop songs thus present a modern, prosperous image of 
Tibet that is grounded in urban centers of power. This 
is essentially the same as nationalist folklore, similar to 
images found in tourist brochures, and a contrast to the 
folk-songs of subsistence agrarian life (ibid). The musical 
and vocal skills of pop singers (less so with dunglen singers) 
also typically embody a polished modernity, honed in state 
institutions where performing arts are professionalized. 
This contrasts with folk music, where most performers 
are amateur. This, together with the high production 
standards of pop and higher-end dunglen, gives a distinct 
kind of gloss. This is also the case with backing dancers 
in videos (it is the case of those dancing to the live 
performance of Gangchanpa). In line with global trends in 
music videos, such gloss and polish is desired by singers 
who want to look good in music videos and not sound like 
they have just come from the village; and who also want 
to present the beautiful landscape and footage of Tibet.37 
Thus, such images and sounds of Tibet conform firmly with 
the aims of the state in terms of heritage, as Martin Saxer 
has discussed (2012), and modernity. 
An interesting exception is Gepe’s song, ‘I am Coming’. 
Although the song has a gloss at the level of high 
production standards, Gepe himself is presented as 
smeared with dirt, wearing dirty clothes and looking 
poor and humble, on the way to meet his brethren in 
exile. Tibet is portrayed as a place to leave and does not 
appear prosperous. The visual presentation of a Tibetan 
in this video cannot be co-opted into state discourse, and 
changes the terms.38 High levels of inequality in Tibet 
and jobless or poor youth are a part of discontent there, 
in addition to explicitly political matters. The emphasis 
on Tibetan identity and identity-based ‘inclusion’ in 
pop songs belies these issues. Indeed, a focus on identity 
politics and the de-emphasis of class in the West has 
been associated with the rise of neoliberalism, as Daniel 
Zamora states, constituting an emphasis on exclusion 
rather than exploitation (2016). With the Tibetan videos 
where identity is presented in prosperous terms, this is 
even more the case.
Another way in which Tibetan pop songs are compatible or 
synergetic with state agendas, rather than being resistant, 
is that they show Tibetan culture to be flourishing and 
Tibetans able to express their identity proudly. In this 
sense, the intense pride of expression of Tibetan identity 
can serve to boost the paternalistic and propagandistic 
discourse that state policy in Tibet supports Tibetan 
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culture and identity and is overall good for Tibetans. That 
China is repressing or destroying Tibetan culture and 
identity is a common position held in Western countries 
and also by Tibetan exiles. In Tibet, Tibetans are certainly 
aware of the limitations on many aspects of their lives. 
The state has been publishing glossy magazines and 
brochures about Tibetan culture in particular since the 
1980s, but propaganda about the colorful and distinct 
minority nationalities and the paternalistic state has been 
ubiquitous from the 1950s. As Saxer describes, starting in 
the new millennium, including from the 2008 period, the 
state has fought with renewed vigor to present itself as 
a friend of Tibetan and other minority cultures. Indeed, 
it was one of the first nations to ratify the 2003 UNESCO 
Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural 
Heritage in 2004 (2012: 71). Tibetanness, therefore, is 
a ‘moral economy’ that the state is heavily invested 
in, for the sake of its international image and, equally 
importantly, for the sake of growing domestic tourism 
in Tibet (ibid). 
Thus, even with apparently daring presentations of 
Tibetan identity or unity in pop songs, the processes 
of appropriation, co-option or control versus assertion 
or resistance are complex and interwoven. Indeed, the 
state certainly learned if not by the end of the Cultural 
Revolution then at least after 1989, that entirely 
suppressing subversive musical scenes is counter-
productive. As Nimrod Baranovitch has explored, Chinese 
rock music, the music of Tiananmen Square protesters, was 
later embraced and appropriated by the state, lessening 
its subversive power (2003).39 With Tibetan ‘culture and 
identity’ pop music and dunglen, the theme of identity 
is thus embraced, and only songs that attach particular 
political imperatives to Tibetan identity are restricted. 
In China, as elsewhere, multiculturalism operates in the 
state’s interests and on the state’s terms, providing only 
limited autonomy and recognition for minorities, although 
it promises something more far-reaching (Povinelli 2002).40 
The arena of pop music and dunglen can be seen to 
significantly support desired images of ‘China’s Tibet’, 
encompassing assertions of Tibetan identity permitted 
by the state. It can thus be envisaged to act as a pressure 
valve in the ongoing insecurity dilemma. It is difficult 
to imagine that popular music has no agency in giving 
Tibetans themselves a sense that they are able, or obliged, 
to be Tibetan in China and to be celebrated as such. But, in 
this context, it is impossible not to note that while there 
is considerable freedom of expression in the realm of pop 
music, and the contained discourse of reified identity 
especially, there is not this level of flourishing or freedom 
of expression in religious worship or Tibetan language 
education. Apart from areas of Amdo in Qinghai and to 
some extent Gansu, Tibetan language is marginalized 
in most school education in Tibet. Furthermore, across 
Tibet, Tibetan medium school and university education 
is increasingly irrelevant to jobs in the modern economy, 
with language requirements in decline in Tibet apart 
from in Qinghai, and ‘very marginal’ in the TAR and 
Gannan (Fischer and Zenz 2016).41 Buddhism in Tibet 
has suffered repression from the Chinese state since the 
1950s due to the atheistic stance of socialism, and more 
specifically, because political power in ‘old Tibet’ was 
embedded in religion (Powers 2017). The Dalai Lama, who 
left Tibet for exile in 1959 amidst a massive uprising, is 
the biggest threat to Chinese legitimacy in Tibet, and 
his continued absence is probably the deepest source 
of resentment amongst Tibetans. In addition, Tibetan 
society is undergoing extraordinary levels of change to 
traditional life, especially in nomadic areas, with extensive 
settlement and fencing programs,42 and there are high 
levels of Han and Muslim Chinese migration to most major 
Tibetan cities or towns. The presentation of minorities as 
happy (with Chinese rule) via depictions of them singing 
and dancing is, as I have mentioned, well-worn, and 
continues into the present day. With the pop music and 
dunglen scenes we have something not dissimilar to this 
in representational power, though there are songs that 
express sadness and fear too.
It is important also to point out that it is relatively cheap 
and easy with mass media and substantial state support 
to make pop music ‘flourish,’ to be extremely prevalent in 
society, as long as there are appealing themes and styles 
for people. Furthermore, it must be noted that it is far 
easier to sing in a given language than speak it fluently, 
which requires real immersion, let alone read and write 
it, which requires intensive schooling and considerable 
investment and commitment. Thus, while the almost 
exclusive turn to singing only in the Tibetan language 
since 2008 is a sign of successful assertion, it is a limited 
context. The much larger problem of the weakness of 
Tibetan as a spoken or written language remains and, 
indeed, intensifies. In this sense, it is important to keep 
in mind the performative and representational power 
of music videos, and how easily this can be multiplied 
with mass mediation. This must be measured carefully 
against wider social and cultural terrains, comparing the 
representation in the given text to broader, on-the-ground 
realities. Viewing pop music as ‘resistant,’ at least in the 
Tibetan case, can give a sense of more potent resistance 
than is really the case in wider society; as Thomas Turino 
has argued, music may represent something imagined 
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as much as something that is actually present (1999), 
and while the representations of imagined realities 
may turn into social reality, they do not always do so. 
The performing arts are performative and visible over 
and above everyday life. But at the same time, they are 
somewhat separate from everyday life. This makes them 
powerful, but at the same time, limited and delineated in 
their performative potency. Their potency should not be 
underestimated, but neither should it be overestimated. 
This is not to say that there is not real protest in music. 
But, singers continue to produce mainstream songs that 
the state is happy to showcase through its media if not 
create in its offices. Thus, it is important to investigate 
the kinds of ‘identity’ that music is performing and 
its place and potency in wider society, the dynamics 
of power involved. 
Songs celebrating Tibetan culture and identity thus need 
to be considered as far more ambiguous and slippery than 
has hitherto been recognized, and as more polyvocal in 
their articulation of power. Alongside the potential for 
Tibetan expression and assertion is the constant potential 
for appropriation and co-option by the state, or perhaps 
the inadvertent reinforcing of state discourse or at least 
categories. Given the utterly towering nature of state 
power that is in question, this is, in fact, not surprising. 
Given the options open to Tibetans in Tibet, popular 
musical forms are in many ways a success. As I have said, 
they are preferable to the old belittling delineations of 
Tibetanness. The growing number of songs that celebrate 
individual love, aspiration and freedom,43 may well also 
be a sign of a decidedly un-ambivalent assimilation into 
the state’s dream of a socialist market utopia, the promise 
of ‘everything’ for whoever will grasp the moment; it is 
too soon to interpret these things, and meaning is never 
univocal. However, real protest and resistance in song is 
censored, and singers, like Gepe, are arrested or detained 
and can pay an extremely heavy price. The fate of those 
involved in street protests is the same, and the vast levels 
of surveillance in Tibet must be noted (Human Rights 
Watch 18 January 2016). Even more tragic are the self-
immolations, shocking individual forms of protest in Tibet, 
which are the most powerful negation of state discourse on 
minority identity. 
Endnotes
1. See Morcom (2004), chapter six. It has been claimed 
that singing in Chinese is a good way for Tibetans to 
‘advertise’ their nationality and raise their profile within 
China, rather than it being a form of ‘identity’ loss. It is 
also very lucrative if singers are able to tap into the vast 
nationwide market.
2. Apart from my own recent article (Morcom 2015), 
Roche’s article on contemporary songs, place, and identity 
is the only other work I know of that critically examines 
the discourse of identity and nationalism in Tibetan 
songs beyond ideas of assertion or protest on the part of 
Tibetans. His focus is on songs that foreground the Tibetan 
alphabet. As he states, these alphabet songs present 
“Tibetan language as the soul of Tibet and the Tibetan 
people” and “that by celebrating a monolingual identity, 
songs stigmatize and marginalize linguistic minorities 
without expressing aggressive or discriminatory attitudes 
towards them” (forthcoming). 
3. In particular, the Tibetan areas, Xinjiang and 
Inner Mongolia account for about 60% of the 
landmass of China today.
4. The term Lhakar (lhag dkar) or ‘White Wednesdays’ is the 
name of a movement much discussed in exile that emerged 
around 2009 in eastern Tibet or Kham that promoted the 
speaking of Tibetan with no Chinese loan words. This term is 
not used across Tibet, nor is the focus on Wednesdays found 
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emphasize that the views expressed in this article are her own 
synthesis and analysis.
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across Tibet; in Amdo, for example, Pha kä tsangma (Pha skad 
gtsang ma), ‘Pure father speech’, is more common. The ‘ten 
virtues’ movement can be traced back to the influential 
teachings and writings of the Buddhist cleric Khenpo Jigme 
Phuntsog dating from 1995, in which the emphasis on 
preservation of Tibetan traditions was central (Gayley 2013). 
More broadly, support for pure Tibetan culture was part of 
the Cultural Revolution revival of the 1980s.
5. Roche also discusses the alphabet songs, but in a very 
different frame to Robin (2014), referring to them as ‘banal 
nationalism’ that is itself hegemonic on minority Tibetan 
languages and groups.
6. The exile-based website High Peaks Pure Earth has 
reported on many of these, providing translations of 
the songs in English (<http://highpeakspureearth.
com/?s=songs&lang=en>) and also a video channel 
(<https://vimeo.com/hpeaks>) (both last accessed 
15 January 2017). 
7. According to the composer Tenzin Penor, involved 
also in ‘My Dondrub Tsering’, the album ‘Songs of the 
Holy Land No. 1’ was a first and rather rough attempt at 
making a popular music style (personal communication 
26 May 07). It was not in the Taiwan-influenced style, and 
did not launch a new Tibetan pop music as ‘My Dondrub 
Tsering’ did. See Morcom (2004) chapters two and four, 
and Morcom (2007) for a discussion of the ‘state style’ in 
the context of Tibetan music.
8. It must be noted that Dadon also performed songs in 
praise of the Party, as a part of the government work unit. 
9. Personal communication, Tenzin Penor, October 2006.
10. I was informed this was the case by Penor (ibid). 
In contrast, Henrion-Dourcy reports the censors were 
caught ‘off-guard’ by Dadon’s album, “the first time the 
authorities found such songs on the market” (2005: 239). 
11. The music was by Penor, who had composed many 
of Dadon’s songs. 
12. This is contrary to the situation described by Harris 
(2002) in the 1990s in Xinjiang.
13. Jigme, interview, 24 July 2005. 
14. Jishi Tso, interview, 25 July 2005.
15. Palgon, interview, 13 July 2005. 
16. Pema, interview, 26 May 2007. 
17. ibid. 
18. Dube, interview, 5 May 2007. 
19. Dore, interview, 14 July 2005. 
20. Pema, interview, 26 May 2007. 
21. The Xining Radio Office produced dunglen cassettes 
later (interviews Pema Khar 15 July 05, 25 May 07).
22. These individuals are part of a whole generation of 
particularly productive and influential Amdo Tibetans 
working in the field of cultural production, many of them 
in state offices (Thurston 2017). 
23. Interestingly, this song was in fact originally written 
in Chinese (but by a Tibetan author), and later translated 
into Tibetan which is when it gained vast popularity. 
This song is available on <https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=r8GL8UQkXC0> (last accessed 17 January 2018). 
24. I am grateful to Holly Gayley for lending her expertise 
to this translation. 
25. ‘Mentally return’, analysed by Warner in his article on 
songs, ‘uncivil religion’ and civil disobedience, is another 
song seen as extremely potent, which was, however, also 
performed at this state-sponsored festival.
26. Other such songs are analyzed by Jabb (2011), who 
focuses on dunglen; Warner (2013); Robin (2013); Morcom 
(2004; 2015); Gayley (2016); Topgyal (2016: 97; 224, fn 64); 
and, with a critical perspective, Roche, on the intensely 
nationalist ‘blood and soil’ alphabet songs (forthcoming). 
Warner (2013) and Morcom (2015) also include a discussion 
of these themes at the level of videos. 
27. See Stirr’s discussion of Tso Ngonbo, ‘Blue lake’, a 
poem by Dondrub Gyal sung by Dadon, as a nationalist 
song (2008). See Thurston (2017) on this generation of 
Tibetan intellectuals in Amdo.
28. Translation slightly adapted from Morcom (2004: 149). 
29. Interpretation plays an immense role in Tibetan 
modern songs, as I discuss in a chapter on ‘Protest, 
perceptions and ambiguities’ (2004: 137-178). Warner also 
discusses this (2013: 12). 
30. This song was remembered by an interviewee 
as taught in political meetings prior to the Cultural 
Revolution (Morcom 2004: 99). 
31. Gladney (1994). I discuss this in the context of Tibetan 
music in Morcom (2004: 25-30; 112-127). 
32. However, it must be noted that this could refer to the 
yoke of serfdom, giving a Party-friendly interpretation of 
this line. I am grateful to Gerald Roche for this point. 
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33. This translation is reproduced from the website High 
Peaks Pure Earth, removing repetitions,  
<http://highpeakspureearth.com/2014/music-video-
three-provinces-by-sonam-rinchen/> (last accessed 16 
July 2016). There are abundant numbers of protest songs 
translated with commentary about the lyrics, music and 
the singers on High Peaks Pure Earth, and it is the best 
resource to see the extent of such songs.
34. However, note that the stage of the 2006 festival 
in Rebkong where Gangchanpa was performed was 
‘decorated to resemble the shrine of the Jowo’ and had an 
image of the Jowo at its centre (Warner 2013: 10). 
35. Again, I reproduce the song here from High Peaks 
Pure Earth, without repetitions, which are quite extensive, 
<http://highpeakspureearth.com/2012/victory-to-tibet-
and-what-we-have-is-suffering-two-songs-by-gebey/> (last 
accessed 16 July 2016). 
36. The degree to which the discourse of ethnicity and 
ethnic identity (minzu) constitutes a pillar of state power is 
also illustrated by Emily Yeh, who argues that discourses 
of indigeneity have not been taken up in Tibet and China 
because to enter into discussion with the state itself 
requires use of the minzu discourse, which conflicts with 
that of indigeneity (2007). 
37. I discuss the emergence of such an ‘aristocracy of 
culture’ in Tibet (Morcom 2007). 
38. A translation and link to the song video is available 
on High Peaks Pure Earth, <http://highpeakspureearth.
com/2014/i-am-on-my-way-and-remembering-the-place-
by-tibetan-singer-gebey/> (last accessed 17 August 2016). 
39. Nooshin describes an opposite situation with Iranian 
pop music where censorship has greatly enhanced this 
music’s subversive power (2005). 
40. I am grateful to Gerald Roche for this point. 
41. On Tibetan language and education see Badeng Nima 
(2008), TibetInfoNet (11 November 2010) and Zenz (2013). 
42. See Levine (2015) for a longitudinal study. She 
describes many nomads benefitting from a mixture 
of urban and rural dwelling and access to schools and 
wage-labor jobs as well as traditional livelihoods, while 
poorer nomads entering much more precarious urban or 
peri-urban existence.
43. An example is the song ‘Fly’ (Phur) by Anu, a sweeping 
hit released in May 2017. For a translation, a link to the 
video and commentary, see <http://highpeakspureearth.
com/2017/music-video-fly-by-anu/>.  
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